What Happened In Taylor?

We start with the school district: the Los Angeles Unified School District (which I will call “LAUSD”), which hired employee Tyler Martin-Brand as a part-time playground worker and supervisor of the Beyond the Bell after-school program, to then supervise an extracurricular program at the school. The Plaintiff’s son, who was then 6 years old, attended that school (but not the after-school program).
Then the Plaintiff asked Martin-Brand to babysit her son.

The following facts are important:
“Although [the Plaintiff] did not know where Martin-Brand lived and knew little about his background, she obtained Martin-Brand’s phone number and arranged for him to pick up [her son] and care for him at Martin-Brand’s house. Taylor trusted Martin-Brand because he worked for LAUSD.
She did not tell anyone that she was going to ask Martin-Brand to babysit [her son], nor that she had made those babysitting arrangements. One of Martin-Brand’s supervisors later learned that he had been babysitting students, but the supervisor was unaware of that fact before Martin-Brand cared for [the Plaintiff’s son].”

This next point is also very important:
“LAUSD’s policy prohibited LAUSD employees from interacting with students off campus, except during school-sponsored activities.”

The Tragedy

Sadly, Martin-Brand beat the Plaintiff’s son to death while babysitting him.

The Lawsuit

The Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that “LAUSD negligently hired, retained, and supervised Martin-Brand, and that this negligence was a substantial factor in harming [the Plaintiff’s son].”
“The case went to trial, and the jury issued a special verdict finding that LAUSD was negligent in hiring and supervising Martin-Brand, that [the Plaintiff mother] was also negligent, and that the negligence of both parties was a substantial factor in causing harm to [the Plaintiff]. The jury awarded [the Plaintiff] $30 million in noneconomic damages. It attributed 90 percent fault to LAUSD, 10 percent to [the Plaintiff], and zero percent to Martin-Brand, the killer.”

Post-Trial Motions

LAUSD filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a motion for a new trial.
Both motions argued that LAUSD was immune from liability for the death under California Education Code section 44808, which provides that “no school district … shall be responsible or in any way liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time when such pupil is not on school property,” unless the district has specifically assumed responsibility for the pupil.
After hearing arguments, the trial court denied both motions and ruled in favor of the Plaintiff.

The Appeal

LAUSD appealed, and the court of appeal agreed with LAUSD to overturn the trial court’s decision.

The Law Here:

JNOV Standard

First, a brief note on JNOV motions:
“A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may only be granted if from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party who obtained the verdict, there is no substantial evidence in support.”

LAUSD’s Argument: Section 44808

Next, LAUSD argued California Education Code section 44808, which I mentioned earlier and which provides:
“no school district … shall be responsible or in any way liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time when such pupil is not on school property,” unless the district has specifically assumed responsibility for the pupil.”

The Court’s Analysis

The Court here analyzed and agreed with Mosley v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (2005), cited as 134 Cal.App.4th 1260, where a high school student died after falling from a truck driven by her basketball coach, who was a former school employee. The student’s parents filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the school district under the theory of negligent hiring and supervision. The trial court concluded that the district was immune under section 44808 and sustained its demurrer. Thus, ruling in favor of the school district.

Conclusion

In the end, the Court here found that LAUSD is statutorily immune from liability, and reversed the trial court’s order and judgment.